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We axiomatically characterize a theory of status quo-dependent choice where an agent faces switching
costs that depend upon both the status quo and the alternative he switches to. In a choice problem
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similar analysis for other theories such as models of status quo bias, magical thinking, inequity aversion,
and fairness; and find that these theories make either invalidated or looser predictions.
Keywords: Choice; Switching Cost; Status Quo Bias; Reference Effect; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Cooperation
JEL classification: D00; D01; D91; C72
∗We thank Levent Kockesen, Ariel Rubinstein, Rani Spiegler, and Roee Teper for their helpful comments and suggestions. The
first author acknowledges financial support from the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, Project #113K370.
†Department of Economics, Ozyegin University. E-mail: begum.guney@ozyegin.edu.tr
‡Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London. E-mail: michael.richter@rhul.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
It has become widely accepted that a status quo may influence choices. In this paper, we characterize a
new axiomatic choice model which is based upon switching costs from a status quo. Switching costs are
frequently observed in real-life decision problems. For example, an agent faces transaction costs when
changing banks as closing/opening accounts can be tedious and payments must be set up anew. A user
faces learning costs when switching operating systems as it takes time and energy to learn a new system,
and compatibility costs if the new operating system is not fully compatible with his existing hardware and
software. Other examples of switching costs include contractual costs incurred when a customer breaks a
long-term contract by switching providers and moral costs incurred when an agent deviates from a social
norm.1 Empirically, there is a substantial literature documenting the impact of switching costs in the airline
(Carlsson and Lo¨fgren (2006)), credit card (Ausubel (1991)) and phone service (Shi et al. (2006)) markets,
and in pricing (Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)).
We characterize a choice procedure where an agent has a utility function and a switching cost function.
When there is no status quo, he simply chooses rationally by maximizing his utility function. When there is a
status quo, choosing any alternative other than the status quo involves a switching cost and the agent chooses
the alternatives that maximize his utility net of the switching cost. These switching costs are non-negative
and may depend on both the status quo and the alternative the agent switches to.
In order to characterize this procedure, we incorporate exogenous status quos into the classical choice
framework, as in the canonical model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). Following a revealed preference
approach, we impose three axioms: (i) choices are rational across problems with a fixed status quo posi-
tion; (ii) choices weakly exhibit status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988))2; and (iii) choices are
continuous.
Our model generalizes the status quo model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014). There, a status quo
narrows the decision maker’s focus to a smaller subset by ruling out some alternatives.3 In our setting, such
1Norms that are personal or social can serve as status quos and deviating from them can induce moral costs on agents. See
Akerlof and Kranton (2005), Gazzaniga (2005), and Levitt and List (2007).
2Status quo bias refers to the phenomenon that an alternative is viewed more positively if it is the status quo. See also Knetsch
(1989), Madrian and Shea (2001), and Choi et al. (2004).
3To see how it differs from models with exogenous reference points that are not necessarily status quos, refer to Tversky and
Kahneman (1991), Bossert and Sprumont (2003), Munro and Sugden (2003) and discussions in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014).
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an agent would declare that he faces unbearable switching costs to all the ruled-out alternatives and zero
costs otherwise. Allowing for more general switching costs, our model is able to incorporate a wider range
of reference effects4, which sets it apart from Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014) and other status quo models
that follow it, such as Ortoleva (2010), Ok et al. (2014), and Riella and Teper (2014).5 The advantage of the
model is shown using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games since it is able to explain Charness et al.’s (2016) data
which the fundamental status quo bias model cannot. Thus, the generalized model we suggest is not solely
of theoretical interest, but has practical applications as well.
Apart from decision theory, switching costs are employed in repeated game settings in which a player
incurs a cost whenever he changes his strategy from one stage to another. That framework is developed by
Klemperer (1987,1995), Beggs and Klemperer (1992), and Lipman and Wang (2000, 2009) and is used to
study topics ranging from inflation-targeting to pricing decisions and entry/deterrence decisions (see Farrell
and Shapiro (1989), Von Weizsa¨cker (1984), Libich (2008), and Caruana and Einav (2008)).
In this paper, we apply our switching cost model to one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games. While coop-
eration is possible in the presence of switching costs in a single Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we find that it is
not “anything goes” across such games. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the cooperation
rates across different Prisoner’s Dilemma games and verify our model’s predictions using Charness et al.’s
(2016) experimental data. We also do a similar analysis to test the predictions of the models of status quo
bias (Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014)), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) and fairness (Rabin
(1993)), and find that they are violated by Charness et al.’s (2016) data. Furthermore, the necessary and
sufficient conditions we derive for the magical thinking model (Daley and Sadowski (2017)) are satisfied by
Charness et al.’s (2016) data, but they are looser than those of the switching cost model. Thus, the switching
cost model has the highest Selten (1991) score; it makes the tightest validated predictions.
4A status quo may affect choices even when itself is not chosen and a reference effect is the change brought about in the relative
ranking of options due to the presence of a status quo. An analysis of Masatlioglu and Uler’s (2013) data reveals that a significant
portion of choices (31.66%) violate status quo irrelevance, the main axiom that we relax (see Section 2 and Appendix II). For
non-status quo reference effects such as the attraction effect, see Huber et al. (1982) and Simonson (1989); the phantom effect, see
Farquhar and Pratkanis (1992, 1993), Pettibone and Weddell (2000), and Guney and Richter (2015); and for a comparison of those
effects, see Highhouse (1996).
5Unlike the status quo-based choice models in the literature, we allow for unavailable status quos. However, it is not the first
model in the literature to allow for the unavailability of reference points. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) and Rubinstein and Zhou
(1999) do so in a bargaining setting while Guney et al. (2018) and an earlier version of Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) do so in a choice
theory setting.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decision theoretic analysis. In
Section 3, Prisoner’s Dilemma games are analyzed both theoretically and using the data of Charness et
al. (2016). Concluding remarks appear in Section 4. All proofs are presented in Appendix I. The details
regarding Masatlioglu and Uler’s (2013) design and our analysis of reference effects therein are provided in
Appendix II.
2 The Model
Define X to be a compact metric space that represents the grand set of alternatives. A preference relation
 is a transitive and reflexive binary relation on X . A choice problem is a pair (S, x) where S is the set of
available alternatives and x is the status quo position. The set S is a non-empty closed subset of X . The
element x is either in X , in which case it is the status quo, or it is an object  that does not belong to X ,
interpreted as a no status quo situation. If the status quo x ∈ S, then it is feasible and if x ∈ X\S, then it is
infeasible. The set of all choice problems with a status quo is Csq(X) while the set of those without a status
quo is C(X), and C(X) is their union. A choice correspondence is a non-empty valued map c : C(X)⇒ X
such that c(S, x) ⊆ S for any (S, x) ∈ C(X).6
To illustrate, consider a decision maker who receives a setO of job offers and must choose among them.
If he is just out of college and unemployed, then he faces a choice problem without a status quo, i.e. (O, ).
If he currently has a job, then his choice problem has a feasible status quo, i.e. (O ∪ {x}, x), since he can
always choose to stick with his present job. Finally, he might have just lost his job and even though it is no
longer available to him, the lost job may still affect his choice. In this case, he faces a choice problem with
an infeasible status quo, i.e. (O, x).
In the classical theory, the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP) makes it possible to view
choices as resulting from the maximization of a complete preference relation. Our first axiom extends
WARP to choice problems with the same status quo position (either a fixed status quo, i.e. x ∈ X , or no
status quo, i.e. x = ).
6This notation follows that of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). It is also consistent with Salant and Rubinstein (2008) who would
refer to the status quo x as a “frame”. Note that, in order to simplify the notation, we drop the curly brackets that would be used to
denote sets within the choice correspondence. For instance, we write c(xy, z) instead of c({x, y}, z).
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Axiom 2.1 (WARP) For any (S, x), (T, x) ∈ C(X) such that T ⊆ S,
c(T, x) = c(S, x) ∩ T , provided that c(S, x) ∩ T 6= ∅.
This axiom states that an agent is rational across problems with the same status quo and across problems
without a status quo. Therefore, irrational behavior can only result from a change in the status quo and the
introduction/removal of a status quo.
The following axiom specifies the choices that are vulnerable to the status quo bias phenomenon.
Axiom 2.2 (Status Quo Bias (SQB)) For any x, y ∈ X ,
(i) if y ∈ c(xy, ), then y ∈ c(xy, y)
(ii) if y = c(xy, ), then y = c(xy, y).
This axiom ensures that designating an alternative as the status quo doesn’t harm its relative value.
Equivalent versions of this axiom can be found in Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) and similar ones in Sug-
den (1999), Munro and Sugden (2003), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Sagi (2006), Apesteguia and Ballester
(2009), Ortoleva (2010), and Riella and Teper (2014). It is this axiom that motivates the interpretation of a
reference point in our model as a status quo.
Finally, the following technical axiom ensures that the agent makes similar choices across similar choice
problems. It is vacuously satisfied when X is finite.
Axiom 2.3 (Upper Hemi-Continuity (UHC)) Suppose that x, y, z ∈ X and (xn), (yn) ∈ X∞ are conver-
gent sequences such that xn → x and yn → y. Then,
(i) yn ∈ c(xnyn, xn) ∀n implies y ∈ c(xy, x).
(ii) yn ∈ c(xnyn, ) ∀n implies y ∈ c(xy, ).
(iii) yn ∈ c(xyn, z) ∀n implies y ∈ c(xy, z)
Part (ii) states that an agent behaves continuously when there is no reference point, while part (iii) states
that he behaves continuously given a fixed reference point.7 Part (i) introduces a further requirement that the
7Rather than focusing on tuples, these parts could be phrased more generally and equivalently (given the other axioms) as c(·, )
being upper hemi-continuous and yn ∈ c(S ∪ yn, z) implying y ∈ c(S ∪ y, z) for any (S, z) ∈ Csq(X). It is straightforward to
show that these formulations are equivalent to Masatlioglu and Ok’s (2014) continuity axiom on their domain of available status
quos.
5
effect of continuously changing reference points on choice is continuous, and this is a novel and intuitively
appealing condition.
Below, our main theorem shows the equivalence between the three aforementioned axioms and a choice
procedure of costly switching from a status quo.
Theorem 2.1 A choice correspondence c satisfies Axioms WARP, SQB, and UHC if and only if there exist
(1) a continuous function U : X → R,
(2) a lower semi-continuous function D : X ×X → R+ with D(x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ X , such that
c(S, ) = argmax
s∈S
U(s) for any (S, ) ∈ C(X)
c(S, x) = argmax
s∈S
U(s)−D(s, x) for any (S, x) ∈ Csq(X).
The “if” direction is straightforward. Regarding the “only if” direction, a straightforward idea would
be to consider status quo-dependent choices and to define rationalizing status quo-dependent preference
relations x for any x ∈ X . Then, one would represent these preference relations as U(·, x) and define
U(s) := U(s, s) and D(s, x) := −U(s, x) +U(s, s) for any s, x ∈ X . This argumentation is only halfway
successful because although U and D together represent the agent’s choices, the non-negativity of D is not
guaranteed.8 The bulk of the proof (presented in Appendix I) involves the creation of an auxiliary preference
relation from which a function U is shown to exist with the property U(s, s) ≥ U(s, x), ∀s, x ∈ X , thereby
delivering the non-negativity of D.
The representation is based on two endogenously derived functions, U and D. The function U con-
veys the status quo-free utility derived from each alternative, while D reveals, for any (y, x) ∈ X × X ,
the switching cost incurred when the agent chooses alternative y in the presence of the status quo x. As
mentioned earlier, there are different types of switching costs, such as physical costs, transaction costs, and
moral costs. Our model is applicable in all these cases since it does not tie the agent to a specific type of
switching cost. We use the letter D to capture the idea of switching costs as a “decrement” in utility.
8This non-negativity is essential for both our interpretation and the “if” direction.
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In the absence of a status quo, the decision maker behaves rationally by choosing the available alter-
natives that maximize U . However, when there is a status quo, say x, the agent chooses the available
alternatives with the highest utility net of the switching cost, U(·)−D(·, x).
For any status quo x, the cost function D(·, x) is minimized at x. This feature guarantees that whenever
an alternative is (weakly) chosen over a status quo, its status quo-free utility is at least as high as the status
quo option’s utility. As a result, the choices characterized here are immune to money pump arguments
(Echenique et al. (2011)). More precisely, for any distinct x, y, z ∈ X , the following choice cycle cannot
be accommodated in our model.
c(xy, x) = y, c(yz, y) = z and c(xz, z) = x.
Identification: As in most deterministic choice models, observed choices are sufficient for ordinal but not
cardinal identification, and this is true here as well. More specifically, U and U − D can be ordinally
identified given the choice data c(S, ) and c(S, z), respectively. However, D cannot be ordinally identified
when it doesn’t affect choices. For example, take X = {x, y, z} such that U(x) > 10 > 1 > U(y) and
U(x)−D(x, z) > U(y)−D(y, z). Then, D(x, z) and D(y, z) can take any value between 0 and 9 and so
cannot be ordinally ranked. In this case, it cannot be determined whether it is costlier to switch from z to
x or z to y and furthermore this has no effect on choice since these switching costs are not large enough to
alter the agent’s ranking of these alternatives.
We now turn to some special cases of the model. First, if D(y, x) = 0 for any x, y ∈ X , then the agent
behaves rationally. Another important special case is one where the cost of choosing an alternative other
than the status quo is either zero or a prohibitively large fixed amount. Such costs can be mathematically
represented by an indicator function and this restricted model is identical to theQ-model of Masatlioglu and
Ok (2014). It relies on an additional axiom called status quo irrelevance (given below for our setting).
Status Quo Irrelevance (SQI). For any x, y, z ∈ X ,
(i) If y ∈ c(xy, x) and z ∈ c(xz, x), then c(yz, ) = c(yz, x).
(ii) If c(xy, x) = x = c(xz, x), then c(yz, ) = c(yz, x).
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According to this specialized model, if the cost of switching from x to y and from x to z are both zero (or
both prohibitively large), then the presence of the status quo x does not affect the choice from {y, z}. Thus,
the status quo x can generate a reference effect only when it prohibits exactly one of y and z.
In contrast, our model allows for “graded reference effects” whereby the status quo x may reverse the
relative ranking of y and z even when the agent is willing to leave the status quo for each (i.e. neither y nor
z is prohibited). To see this, consider an agent who faces three alternatives {0, 1, 2} with U(x) = 2.5x and
D(x, y) = |x − y|2. When there is no status quo, the agent ranks 2  1  0. However, when the status
quo is 0, the agent ranks 1 0 2 0 0. The status quo 0 changes the relative ranking of 1 and 2 without
forbidding either of them. This behavior cannot be accommodated in the Q-model.
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) consider a further specialization where for each status quo x, an agent faces
a threshold φ(x) > 0 and will only consider other alternatives y for which U(y) − U(x) ≥ φ(x). In our
framework, this can be represented by D(y, x) = φ(x) whenever x 6= y. Thus, the relationship between the
three models can be stated as follows:
φ(x)-model $ Q-model $ Switching Cost model
While some real-life scenarios naturally fit either the φ(x)-model or the Q-model, many important
situations require the fully general model. For example, a move from Windows to a Mac or to a Linux
system involves compatibility costs, since only some Windows programs are available for the Mac and even
fewer for Linux. Moreover, the Mac and Linux systems differ in cost. These switching costs depend on
both the status quo and the alternative the agent switches to. Therefore, they cannot be represented by a φ
function that depends only on the status quo.
Remark 1: Notice that WARP guarantees the existence of preference relations {x}x∈X and  that
rationalize the status quo-dependent and status quo-free choices, respectively. Axiom SQB then ensures
a link between these preferences (specifically, x % y ⇒ x %x y and x  y ⇒ x x y). This representation
is equivalent to our switching cost model in terms of the choices it gives rise to, though it does not provide
a direct route to our representation, as discussed immediately after Theorem 2.1. Furthermore, the model
with switching costs has several advantages. First, it is intuitively appealing to explain the status quo bias
through switching costs from a status quo. Second, the switching cost model is tractable for applications as
exemplified by the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Section 3).
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Remark 2: In our model, D ≥ 0. If D(y, x) were allowed to be negative when y  x, then all the axioms
would continue to hold. In other words, the model in which an agent can receive a utility “increment” rather
than a “decrement” when switching from a status quo to a higher-utility alternative would be equivalent to
our model. On the other hand, if D were allowed to be negative when an agent switches to a lower-utility
alternative, then this could lead to violations of Axiom SQB. While such a model would not be ideal for
the characterization of status quo-based choices, it might still be of interest as a choice model based on a
general reference point. That procedure with a possibly negative D is characterized by the WARP and UHC
axioms. In this case, the halfway successful approach suggested immediately after Theorem 2.1 would now
be fully successful because the non-negativity requirement on D is relaxed.
Remark 3: The two most common loss-aversion models in the literature are Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1991) general loss aversion and additive linear loss aversion models. These models satisfy WARP and
UHC, and therefore nest into the switching cost model with a possibly negative D. Their additive linear loss
aversion model additionally satisfies Axiom SQB and therefore nests within Theorem 2.1.9 In these models,
alternatives are multi-dimensional and each alternative may have multiple gains and losses relative to a
reference point, which the agent must then aggregate to an overall cost function. In contrast, our switching
cost model operates over an abstract space and the function D already gives the overall cost.
3 An Application to Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
In this section, we analyze Prisoner’s Dilemma games using various equilibrium concepts, starting with
one based on switching costs. Formally, a standard one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a 2 × 2 game
where both players face the same action sets A1 = A2 = {Coop,Defect} and have symmetric utility func-
tions U1(x, y) = U2(y, x) ∀x, y ∈ {Coop,Defect} such that U1(Defect, Coop) > U1(Coop,Coop) >
U1(Defect,Defect) > U1(Coop,Defect). Notice thatDefect is a dominant strategy and (Defect,Defect)
is the unique standard Nash equilibrium of this game.
9Masatlioglu and Ok (2014) show that the general loss aversion model need not satisfy Axiom SQB and therefore does not nest
in Theorem 2.1.
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3.1 Switching Costs
In a one-shot game, both (Defect,Defect) and (Coop,Coop) are possible equilibrium outcomes given
appropriate status quos and sufficiently high switching costs. However, and perhaps surprisingly, it is not
“anything goes” across a constant population and different Prisoner’s Dilemma games. We show this by first
defining a population equilibrium concept and then deriving conditions on cooperation rates across different
Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Finally, we test these conditions using Charness et al.’s (2016) data.
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, an agent with a status quo and a switching cost function can be repre-
sented by an element of a type space Θ = {Coop,Defect} × R2+. This motivates the following definition
of a Prisoner’s Dilemma D-game for a population who is randomly matched into pairs to play it.10,11
Definition: A Prisoner’s Dilemma D-Game is a pair < Γ, F > where Γ is a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma
game and F is a continuous distribution on Θ.
For a player’s decision whether to cooperate or defect, all that matters is his belief about whether others
are choosing Coop orDefect. In equilibrium, all players have correct beliefs and this leads to the following
definition of a population equilibrium.12
Definition: In a Prisoner’s Dilemma D-game < Γ, F >, a population equilibrium is a measurable map
a : Θ→ {Coop,Defect} such that for every θ = (sθ, Dθ) ∈ Θ,
a(θ) ∈ argmax
a∈{Coop,Defect}
p U1(a,Coop) + (1− p) U1(a,Defect)−Dθ(a, sθ)
where p := F ({θ ∈ Θ : a(θ) = Coop}).
Charness et al. (2016) ran a Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment, denoted by Γx, where x is the same for
both players and equals 3, 4, 5, or 6. Payoffs are shown in the following table.
10In the model, agents are randomly matched into pairs to play a Prisoner’s Dilemma D-game. Given expected utility, it would
be equivalent if each player plays with every other player and receives their average payoff.
11We express our thanks to an anonymous referee who suggested the simplifying notation and definition.
12Note that the equilibrium condition in the definition is phrased only in terms of the first player’s utilities because agents face
the same action sets and have symmetric utility functions.
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Coop Defect
Coop x, x 1, 7
Defect 7, 1 2, 2
Table 1: Charness et al.’s (2016) Prisoner’s Dilemma games
For a fixed population F , we study the population equilibria of the Prisoner’s Dilemma D-games
< Γx, F > and denote them as ax. The following proposition shows that the population equilibrium ax
is well-defined and unique (up to a measure 0 set of ties) for each x. For a population equilibrium ax, the
fraction of agents who cooperate is denoted by px and referred to as the cooperation rate.
Proposition 3.1 For each Prisoner’s Dilemma D-game < Γx, F > where F has full support and x ≤ 6,
there is a unique population equilibrium.
The following proposition provides three necessary and sufficient conditions on px for a sequence of
population equilibria to be derived from a fixed population F . First, it must be that px is increasing in x.
Second, there is an upper bound on how quickly px can increase. Third, px is non-trivial, there are both
cooperators and defectors.
Proposition 3.2 Let (px)x∈{3,4,5,6} be a sequence of probabilities. The sequence (px) is a cooperation rate
sequence for some Prisoner’s Dilemma D-games < Γx, F > where F has full support if and only if
• px is strictly increasing in x, (monotonicity condition)
• px <
(
7− x
6− x
)
· px−1 for x ∈ {4, 5}, (threshold condition)
• 0 < px < 1, for all x. (non-triviality condition)
The non-triviality condition is straightforward, given a distribution with full support – some agents will
cooperate and some will defect. The monotonicity condition is intuitive and was a hypothesis in Charness
et al. (2016). On the other hand, the threshold condition is novel. To understand it, notice that an agent
cooperates if and only if his status quo is Coop and
(6− x) · px + 1 < Dθ(Defect, Coop).
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The left-hand side of the above inequality provides a cooperation threshold.13 For more agents to cooperate
when x increases, it must be that the cooperation threshold decreases. The threshold condition is equivalent
to requiring that (6− x)px + 1 is decreasing in x.
In Table 2 below, the observed cooperation rates are those from Charness et al. (2016). We further
calculate the cooperation thresholds and derive bounds on the cooperation rates. To understand these derived
bounds, consider x = 4. By monotonicity, the cooperation rate p4 must be 23.46% ≤ p4 ≤ 50.60%. By the
threshold condition, it must be that p5 < (2/1) · p4 and that p4 < (3/2) · p3. Therefore, 25.30% < p4 <
35.19%. Consequently, max{23.46%, 25.30%} < p4 < min{50.60%, 35.19%} where in both cases the
tighter bounds are due to the threshold condition. Bounds for the other px’s can be derived similarly. Since
both conditions imply bounds, the tighter bound is indicated with anm (monotonicity) or t (treshold) below.
x Observed Coop Rate (6− x)px + 1 Coop Lower Bound Coop Upper Bound
3 23.46% 1.70 22.45%t 33.67%m
4 33.67% 1.67 25.30%t 35.19%t
5 50.60% 1.51 33.67%m 60.47%m
6 60.47% 1.00 50.60%m 100%
Table 2: Cooperation rates from Charness et al. (2016) and bounds derived from Proposition 3.2
Table 2 demonstrates that the monotonicity and threshold conditions both hold, as must the derived
bounds. In a structural estimation, these cooperation thresholds can be used to back out agents’ switching
costs and status quos. For example, when x = 3, it is estimated that 23.46% of the population has a status
quo of Coop and switching costs higher than 1.70.14
3.2 Other Models that Lead to Cooperation
In this section, we examine other theories in the literature that can explain cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
games and study their predictions with the goal of comparing them to our theory’s predictions. Overall, we
find that our theory provides the tightest predictions that are in line with Charness et al.’s (2016) data.
13For further details on this threshold, see Lemma 3.0 in Appendix I.
14Alternatively, 76.54% of the population has a status quo of Defect or switching costs less than 1.70.
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3.2.1 Q-Model (Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014))
In the Q-model, an agent’s type is expressed by his status quo (Coop or Defect) and his constraint sets
(Q(Coop) and Q(Defect)). Any heterogeneous population of agents can be partitioned into three groups.
The first group consists of all agents for whom Defect is the status quo. The alternative Defect is their
highest-utility alternative and is available in theirQ-set (because x ∈ Q(x) for all x). Hence, these agents al-
ways defect. The second group consists of agents for whomCoop is the status quo andDefect ∈ Q(Coop).
These agents also defect because Defect is their best option and it is available in their Q-set. Finally, the
third group consists of agents for whom Coop is the status quo and Q(Coop) = {Coop}. These agents
necessarily cooperate because Coop is the only alternative that they consider. Therefore, for a given x, with
payoffs from Table 1, the cooperation rate px expresses the fraction of agents in this third group. Given a
fixed population, the size of the third group does not vary and therefore the cooperation rate is predicted to
remain constant in x. In other words, Q-model predicts p3 = p4 = p5 = p6. However, this is not the case in
Charness et al.’s (2016) data.
3.2.2 Magical Thinking (Daley and Sadowski (2017))
In the magical thinking model, a decision maker thinks that his opponent takes the same action as he does
with probability λ and takes the equilibrium action with probability 1−λ. Hence, the type space is ΘMT =
[0, 1]. We now define Prisoner’s Dilemma games and population equilibrium for the magical thinking model,
as we did for the switching cost model.
Definition: A Prisoner’s Dilemma MT-Game is a pair < Γ, F > where Γ is a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma
game and F is a continuous distribution on ΘMT .
Definition: In a Prisoner’s Dilemma MT-game < Γ, F >, an MT -population equilibrium is a measurable
map a : ΘMT → {Coop,Defect} such that for every λ ∈ ΘMT ,
a(λ) ∈ argmax
a∈{Coop,Defect}
λ · U1(a, a) + (1− λ) · (p · U1(a,Coop) + (1− p) · U1(a,Defect))
where p := F ({λ ∈ ΘMT : a(λ) = Coop}).
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For a fixed population F , we study MT-population equilibria of the Prisoner’s Dilemma MT-games
< Γx, F >. As before, there exists a unique MT-population equilibrium for each x. The fraction of agents
who cooperate in an MT-population equilibrium is denoted as px and referred to as the magical thinking
cooperation rate.
Proposition 3.3 For each Prisoner’s Dilemma MT -game < Γx, F > where F has full support and x ≤ 6,
there is a unique MT-population equilibrium.
In the spirit of revealed preference, Daley and Sadowski (2017) provide a characterization of their model
over the domain of all simultaneous and symmetric 2× 2 games. However, as is well-known in the revealed
preference literature, the set of axioms which characterize a procedure over a large data set is generally
insufficient for smaller domains. The following proposition offers a novel characterization of magical think-
ing cooperation rates for Charness et al.’s (2016) domain.
Proposition 3.4 Let (px)x∈{3,4,5,6} be a sequence of probabilties.
(i) The sequence (px) is a magical thinking cooperation rate sequence for some Prisoner’s Dilemma
MT-games < Γx, F > where F has full support if and only if
• px is strictly increasing in x, (monotonicity condition)
• px <
(x− 2)(7− x)
(x− 3)(6− x)px−1 +
1
(x− 3)(6− x) for x ∈ {4, 5}, (threshold condition)
• 0 < px < 1, for all x. (non-triviality condition)
(ii) The switching cost cooperation rate conditions are analytically tighter than those of magical thinking.
As in the switching cost model, the conditions on cooperation rates here come from three sources: a non-
triviality and a monotonicity condition both of which are the same as in our model, and a threshold condition
that is different than ours. Part (ii) of the above proposition demonstrates analytically that any cooperation
rate px that can be explained by our switching cost model can also be explained by the magical thinking
model. However, the reverse does not necessarily hold since the magical thinking threshold condition is
strictly weaker than the switching cost threshold condition.
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Table 3 shows that for Charness et al.’s (2016) data, the cooperation rate bounds of the magical thinking
model are strictly weaker than those of the switching cost model. In fact, for this data set, all of the magical
thinking bounds come from the monotonicity condition. Thus, the switching cost model is strictly more
restrictive because its threshold conditions are tighter. Consequently, the switching cost model has a higher
Selten (1991) score than the magical thinking model.15
x Observed Cooperation Switching Cost Model Magical Thinking Model
Rate Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
3 23.46% 22.33%t 33.67%m 0% 33.67%m
4 33.67% 25.30%t 35.19%t 23.46%m 50.60%m
5 50.60% 33.67%m 60.47%m 33.67%m 60.47%m
6 60.47% 50.60%m 100% 50.60%m 100%
Table 3: Cooperation rates from Charness et al. (2016) and bounds derived from Propositions 3.2 and 3.4
3.2.3 Inequity Aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999))
In a general version of the inequity aversion model, an agent derives the following utility:
Vi = Ui − αi max
j
(Ui − Uj , 0)− βi max
j
(Uj − Ui, 0)
where U represents payoffs from the game and 0 ≤ αi < βi < 1.16 Hence, the type space is ΘIA =
{(α, β) : 0 ≤ α < β < 1}. We now define Prisoner’s Dilemma games and population equilibrium for the
inequity aversion model, as we did for the previous models.
Definition: A Prisoner’s Dilemma IA-Game is a pair < Γ, F > where Γ is a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma
game and F is a continuous distribution on ΘIA.
15The Selten score is a measure of the predictive success of a model. It is the proportion of data consistent with the model minus
the probability that any random data is consistent with that model. As both the switching cost model and the magical thinking
model are consistent with the observed data, then the more restrictive model has a higher Selten score.
16An agent with utility Vi cares about his own payoff but is also averse to inequity. The parameters αi and βi specify how
much aversion he feels towards unequal payoffs: αi when the agent himself receives the higher payoff and βi when the other agent
receives the higher payoff. The condition αi < βi states that inequity bothers the agent more when he is receiving the lesser payoff.
The requirement that αi, βi < 1 implies that the agent is not willing to sacrifice his own payoff in order to achieve a more equal
outcome. That is, holding the other player’s payoff fixed, the agent aims to maximize his own payoff.
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Definition: In a Prisoner’s Dilemma IA-game < Γ, F >, an IA-population equilibrium is a measurable
map a : ΘIA → {Coop,Defect} such that for every λ = (α, β) ∈ ΘIA,
a(λ) ∈ argmax
a∈{Coop,Defect}
pU1(a,Coop) + (1− p)U1(a,Defect)− 6pα1a=Defect − 6(1− p)β1a=Coop
where p := F ({λ ∈ ΘIA : a(λ) = Coop}).
For a fixed population F , we study IA-population equilibria of the Prisoner’s Dilemma IA-games
< Γx, F >. Unlike before, an IA-population equilibrium may not be unique.
Proposition 3.5 For each Prisoner’s Dilemma IA-game < Γx, F > where F has full support and x ≤ 6,
there exists an IA-population equilibrium. However, uniqueness is not guaranteed and there is a Prisoner’s
Dilemma IA-game with multiple IA-population equilibria.
For an IA-population equilibrium, we refer to px as the corresponding inequity aversion cooperation
rate. While, for a given F , there may be multiple IA-population equilibria and thus multiple cooperation
rates, the following proposition provides a necessary condition that all of these cooperation rates must
satisfy.
Proposition 3.6 Let px be the inequity aversion cooperation rate for an equilibrium of a Prisoner’s Dilemma
IA-game < Γx, F > where F has full support and x ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}. Then, either of the following must hold:
• px = 0 (trivial equilibrium)
• px >
7
6 + x
(non-trivial equilibrium)
Notice that the necessary conditions derived in the above proposition are of a different sort. In the
switching cost and magical thinking models, the derived conditions were across different px whereas here
the conditions must be satisfied for each individual px.
Table 4 displays the cooperation rate conditions for each value of x. Generally, the above conditions for
the inequity aversion model are not met by Charness et al.’s (2016) data.
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x Observed Coop Rate Inequity Aversion Conditions
3 23.46% p3 = 0% or p3 > 77.78%
4 33.67% p4 = 0% or p4 > 70.00%
5 50.60% p5 = 0% or p5 > 63.64%
6 60.47% p6 = 0% or p6 > 58.33%
Table 4: Cooperation rates from Charness et al. (2016) and conditions derived from Proposition 3.6
Remark: The multiplicity of IA-population equilibria poses an obstacle to performing an analysis of coop-
eration rates across different x’s as was done for the other models. Moreover, such an analysis would only
serve to further restrict this model’s predictions and therefore they would remain unsatisfied.
3.2.4 Fairness (Rabin (1993))
In order to apply the fairness model to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we follow Daley and Sadowski’s
(2017) formulation and perform all possible algebraic reductions. Each agent has the following utility:
Vi(ai, aj) = Ui(ai, aj) + λiK(ai, aj), where λi ≥ 0 and K(ai, aj) =

3/4 if ai = aj
−1/4 if ai 6= aj .
Each agent’s coefficient λi is therefore his type and the type space is ΘFAIR = R+. The kindness function
K creates a coordination motivation: it is good for an agent to cooperate when his opponent cooperates and
to defect when his opponent defects. This reflects an underlying motivation that an agent would like to be
kind when his opponent is kind and mean when his opponent is mean.
We now define Prisoner’s Dilemma games and population equilibrium for the fairness model, as we did
for the previous models.
Definition: A Prisoner’s Dilemma FAIR-Game is a pair< Γ, F >where Γ is a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma
game and F is a continuous distribution on ΘFAIR.
Definition: In a Prisoner’s Dilemma FAIR-game< Γ, F >, aFAIR-population equilibrium is a measurable
map a : ΘFAIR → {Coop,Defect} such that for every λ ∈ ΘFAIR,
a(λ) ∈ argmax
a∈{Coop,Defect}
pU1(a,Coop)+(1−p)U1(a,Defect)+
(
3
4
− p
)
λ1a=Defect+
(
p− 1
4
)
λ1a=Coop
where p := F ({λ ∈ ΘFAIR : a(λ) = Coop}).
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For a fixed population F , we study FAIR-population equilibria of the Prisoner’s Dilemma FAIR-games
< Γx, F >. As in inequity aversion, a FAIR-population equilibrium may not be unique.
Proposition 3.7 For each Prisoner’s Dilemma FAIR-game < Γx, F > where F has full support and
x ≤ 6, there exists a FAIR-population equilibrium. However, uniqueness is not guaranteed and there is a
Prisoner’s Dilemma FAIR-game with infinitely many FAIR-population equilibria.
To understand this proposition, notice that there is always a FAIR-population equilibrium where all
players defect because both material incentives and the kindness (meanness) motivation lead an agent to
defect when all other players defect. On the other hand, the coordination motivation (created by the kindness
function) often gives rise to a cooperative equilibrium where a majority of agents cooperate. In fact, there
are distributions of agents for which there are infinitely many cooperative equilibria.
For a FAIR-population equilibrium, we refer to px as the corresponding fairness cooperation rate. As
noted, for a given F , there may be multiple FAIR-population equilibria and thus multiple cooperation rates.
The following proposition provides a necessary condition which all of the cooperation rates must satisfy.
Proposition 3.8 Let px be the fairness cooperation rate for an equilibrium of a Prisoner’s Dilemma FAIR-
game < Γx, F > where F has full support and x ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}. Then, either of the following must hold:
• px = 0 (defect equilibrium)
• px >
1
2
(cooperative equilibrium)
Therefore, the fairness model requires that all cooperation rates are either 0 or above 50%, and this is
inconsistent with Charness et al.’s (2016) data.
x Observed Coop Rate Fairness Conditions
3 23.46% p3 = 0% or p3 > 50%
4 33.67% p4 = 0% or p4 > 50%
5 50.60% p5 = 0% or p5 > 50%
6 60.47% p6 = 0% or p6 > 50%
Table 5: Cooperation rates from Charness et al. (2016) and conditions derived from Proposition 3.8
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3.3 Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
Up until this point, we have focused exclusively on one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Classically, Kreps
et al. (1982) demonstrate that cooperation can be sustained in a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
when there is a small probability that a player is a committed Tit-for-Tat type.17 Interestingly, in all se-
quential equilbria (Kreps and Wilson (1982)), rational players who have full access to all strategies may
then choose to imitate the Tit-for-Tat player in order to develop a reputation that he is actually a Tit-for-Tat
player. His opponent, not knowing the player’s type, may end up cooperating as well, rather than testing
him. This cooperation crucially depends on the game being repeated. In a one-shot setting, there is no
possibility of developing a reputation and thus no rational type would cooperate. Thus, the introduction
of behavioral types is a method that can sustain cooperation only in repeated settings but not in one-shot
settings.
As mentioned earlier, Lipman and Wang (2000) study a model in which an agent incurs a switching
cost every time he alters his strategy from one stage to another. They find that cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game depends upon a sensitive trade-off, since the switching costs reduce both the incentives to
defect from cooperation and the incentives to punish others’ defections. As in the commitment models
above, Lipman and Wang’s (2000) model can sustain cooperation only in repeated settings.
On the other hand, our switching cost model can sustain cooperation even in one-shot settings. Thus,
without any additional features (such as behavioral types), it can also sustain cooperation in a finitely re-
peated setting, since the repetition of the one-shot equilibrium is an equilibrium of the repeated game.
Committed behavioral types can also be added, if one wants a model with: (i) cooperation in both one-shot
and repeated settings, and (ii) more cooperation in repeated settings than in one-shot settings (as in Cooper
et al.’s (1996) experimental findings).
17A Tit-for-Tat player plays Coop in the first stage. In every other stage, he imitates the other player’s previous play. This
strategy is called Tit-for-Tat because it has the sensible logic: “If you cooperated yesterday, then so will I today, but if you defected,
then I am going to punish you by defecting today.”
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4 Concluding Remarks
We propose and axiomatically characterize a status quo-based choice model where an agent incurs a cost
when switching from a status quo to another alternative. In a choice problem with a status quo, the agent
chooses the alternatives with the highest utility net of this switching cost. This model accommodates status
quo bias and general reference effects.
We apply the model to a particular class of Prisoner’s Dilemma games, and establish necessary and
sufficient conditions for a cooperation rate in these games to be generated by our model. Using Charness et
al.’s (2016) experimental data, we verify that these conditions hold. We then compare our model’s theoretical
predictions with those of other theories for this class of Prisoner’s Dilemma games and find that our theory
provides the tightest predictions that are consistent with Charness et al.’s (2016) data. While our results are
tailored to Charness et al.’s (2016) domain, they also hold true in other settings.18
It has been suggested that status quos can be paternalistically effective in influencing people’s decisions
in a variety of areas from healthcare to investment (Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Madrian and Shea
(2001), Choi et al. (2004), and Thaler and Sunstein (2008)). Our model provides a more nuanced view of a
status quo’s impact. First, status quos might not only rule alternatives out, as described in the literature, but
may also steer agents’ behavior in other directions. Second, if switching costs provide a basis for the status
quo bias phenomenon, then one needs to be careful when evaluating the welfare implications of paternalistic
policies. This is because, for a proper accounting, the benefits that come from superior choices need to be
weighed against the switching costs incurred by the agents.19 We hope that this viewpoint proves useful in
such policy work.
Finally, a question that naturally arises is whether the switching cost model can also be employed in
extensive form games in general. One approach would be to consider the normal form of such games
(that is, the one-shot game where players choose strategies for the extensive form game) and then to define
switching costs between strategies (rather than between actions). This strategy-based switching cost should
incorporate the dynamic structure of the game, for example, one natural switching cost function would be
the discounted sum of switching costs from each node.
18For example, for Proposition 3.2, if we had data for a continuous range of x, then the conditions would become: px is strictly
increasing in x; (6− x) · px < (6− y) · py for all x < y < 6; and 0 < px < 1.
19Arad and Rubinstein (2018) conduct a survey regarding paternalistic policies. While a majority of respondents support such
policies, a substantial proportion opposes them and switching costs could provide a basis for such a rejection.
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Appendix I
(A) Proof of Section 2 Results
Proof of Theorem 2.1
[Sufficiency] Take any choice correspondence c that satisfies Axioms WARP, SQB, and UHC. Define the
reference-free preference  as follows: a  b if a ∈ c(ab, ). The preference relation  is continuous by
Axiom UHC (ii) and complete by Axiom WARP such that c(S, ) = max
s∈S
(S,) for any (S, ) ∈ C(X).
Now, define ∗ as follows:
(x, y) ∗ (z, t) if either y = t and x ∈ c(xz, y), or there exists e ∈ X such that (1) e ∈ c(ez, t), (2) y  e,
and (3) x ∈ c(xy, y).
Notice that ∗ is reflexive and moreover (a, a) ∗ (a, b) for any a, b ∈ X .20
Claim 0: For any x, y, z ∈ X , if (x, y) ∗ (z, y), then x ∈ c(xz, y).
Proof of Claim 0: The preference relation ∗ is defined according to two conditions. We now show that in
the case above, the second condition implies the first, that is, if there exists an e such that (1) e ∈ c(ez, y),
(2) y  e, and (3) x ∈ c(xy, y), then x ∈ c(xz, y). By definition, (2) states that y ∈ c(ey, ). By Axiom
SQB(i), y ∈ c(ey, y). Suppose that x /∈ c(exyz, y). Then, c(exyz, y) ∩ {x, y} 6= c(xy, y), so by WARP
it must be that y /∈ c(exyz, y). But, then c(exyz, y) ∩ {e, y} 6= c(ey, y) and again by WARP, it must be
that e /∈ c(exyz, y). Thus, z = c(exyz, y) and WARP implies z = c(ez, y), a contradiction. Therefore,
x ∈ c(exyz, y) and by WARP, x ∈ c(xz, y).
Claim 1: For any x, y ∈ X , (x, x) ∗ (y, y) if and only if x  y.
Proof of Claim 1: To prove the if direction, let e in the definition of ∗ be equal to y. To prove the only if
direction, suppose (x, x) ∗ (y, y) for some x, y ∈ X . Then, by definition of ∗, there must exist e ∈ X
such that e ∈ c(ey, y) and x  e. If e /∈ c(ey, ), then y = c(ey, ) and axiom SQB(ii) implies that
y = c(ey, y), contradicting the fact that e ∈ c(ey, y). Therefore, e ∈ c(ey, ). Since  represents c(·, ),
we have e  y, which in turn implies x  y.
20Simply choose e = a in the definition of ∗.
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Claim 2: c(S, x) = max
s∈S
((s, x),∗)
Proof of Claim 2: Let y ∈ c(S, x). Axiom WARP implies y ∈ c(yz, x) for any z ∈ S. Then, by definition
of ∗, we obtain (y, x) ∗ (z, x) for any z ∈ S. To show the other inclusion, suppose s ∈ S such that
(s, x) ∗ (t, x) for any t ∈ S but s /∈ c(S, x). Since c(S, x) 6= ∅, there must exist r ∈ c(S, x). Axiom
WARP implies r ∈ c(rs, x). Since (s, x) is the maximizer of ∗ on S, we have (s, x) ∗ (r, x). By Claim
0, s ∈ c(rs, x). Therefore s ∈ c(rs, x) and so {r, s} = c(rs, x). As r ∈ c(S, x), Axiom WARP states that
s ∈ c(S, x), which is a contradiction.
Claim 3: ∗ is transitive.
Proof of Claim 3: Suppose (x, y) ∗ (z, t) and (z, t) ∗ (m,n) for some x, y, z, t,m, n ∈ X , and we
need to show (x, y) ∗ (m,n). There are four possible cases:
Case 1: y = t = n
By Claim 0, x ∈ c(xz, y) and z ∈ c(zm, y). By standard arguments, since c(·, y) satisfies WARP, it is the
case that x ∈ c(xm, y). Therefore, (x, y) ∗ (m, y).
Case 2: y = t and t 6= n
By Claim 0, x ∈ c(xz, y). By the definition of ∗, there exists e such that e ∈ c(em, n), y  e, and
z ∈ c(zy, y). By Case 1, x ∈ c(xy, y). By the definition of ∗, we have (x, y) ∗ (m,n).
Case 3: t = n and y 6= t
Again, by Claim 0, z ∈ c(zm, t) and by the definition of ∗, there exists an e such that e ∈ c(ez, t), y  e,
and x ∈ c(xy, y). By Case 1, e ∈ c(em, t).21 The definition of ∗ then states (x, y) ∗ (m, t).
Case 4: t 6= n and y 6= t
(x, y) ∗ (z, t) implies that there exists e ∈ X such that e ∈ c(ez, t), y  e, and x ∈ c(xy, y). Similarly,
(z, t) ∗ (m,n) guarantees that there exists f ∈ X such that f ∈ c(mf, n), t  f , and z ∈ c(zt, t). Then,
we obtain
(y, y) ∗ (e, e) ∗ (e, t) ∗ (z, t) ∗ (t, t) ∗ (f, f).
Applying transitivity of ∗ to case 3 type of pairs reduces the above to
(y, y) ∗ (e, e) ∗ (t, t) ∗ (f, f)
Claim 1 together with the transitivity of  gives y  f . Then, by the definition of ∗, we conclude that
(x, y) ∗ (m,n).
21Case 1 is applied to (e, t) ∗ (z, t) and (z, t) ∗ (m, t).
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Claim 4: ∗ is upper semi-continuous.
Proof of Claim 4: Suppose (xn, yn) ∗ (z, t) for all n, where xn, yn, x, y, z, t ∈ X such that xn → x and
yn → y. We need to show (x, y) ∗ (z, t).
Suppose yn = t for infinitely many n. Then, by Claim 0, it is the case that xn ∈ c(xnz, t) for infinitely
many n. Axiom UHC (iii) implies x ∈ c(xz, t). Moreover, by the definition of a limit, y = t. Thus,
(x, y) ∗ (z, t).
Suppose yn 6= t for infinitely many n. Then, there exist infinitely many en ∈ X such that en ∈ c(enz, t),
yn  en, and xn ∈ c(xnyn, yn). Since X is compact, there exists a convergent subsequence enk of en such
that enk → e for some e ∈ X . Axiom UHC (i) gives e ∈ c(ez, t), y  e, and x ∈ c(xy, y). According to
the definition of ∗, we obtain (x, y) ∗ (z, t).
Remember that ∗ is reflexive, transitive, and upper semi-continuous while not necessarily complete
over the entire space. Jaffray’s (1975) result guarantees that ∗ can be extended to a reflexive, transitive,
upper semi-continuous, and complete relation denoted by ∗E .
Remark: As shown in Claim 2, given a fixed status quo, the original preference relation is complete and
rationalizes choices. The extended relation respects this ranking and therefore it rationalizes choices, given
a fixed status quo.
Rader’s (1963) result ensures the existence of an upper semi-continuous utility function U : X×X → R
that represents ∗E . This, together with the remark above, gives
c(S, x) = argmax
s∈S
U(s, x) for any (S, x) ∈ Csq(X).
Claim 1 and the fact that ∗E respects ranking by ∗ allows us to define U : X → R by U(x) :=
U(x, x) for any x ∈ X so that U rationalizes c(·, ). We also define D : X × X → R+ by setting
D(s, x) = −U(s, x) + U(s, s) for any s, x ∈ X . Then,
c(S, x) = argmax
s∈S
U(s)−D(s, x) for any (S, x) ∈ Csq(X).
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Notice first that D(x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ X . Second, D is lower semi-continuous since U is upper
semi-continuous and U is continuous. Moreover, D(s, x) ≥ 0 for any x, s ∈ X because (s, s) ∗ (s, x)
and therefore (s, s) ∗E (s, x) which in turn implies U(s, s)− U(s, x) ≥ 0.
[Necessity] Take any continuous utility function U : X → R and a lower semi-continuous function D :
X × X → R+ with D(x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ X . Suppose also that c(S, ) = argmax
s∈S
U(s) for any
(S, ) ∈ C(X) and c(S, x) = argmax
s∈S
U(s)−D(s, x) for any (S, x) ∈ Csq(X).
Axiom WARP is trivially satisfied across a fixed status quo position. To see Axiom SQB(i), take y ∈
c(xy, ). Then U(y) ≥ U(x) and D(y, y) = 0 ≤ D(x, y). Therefore U(y)−D(y, y) ≥ U(x)−D(x, y)
⇒ y ∈ c(xy, y). To see Axiom SQB(ii), take y = c(xy, ). Then U(y) > U(x) and D(y, y) = 0 ≤
D(x, y). Therefore U(y)−D(y, y) > U(x)−D(x, y)⇒ y = c(xy, y).
To show Axiom UHC (i), suppose yn ∈ c(ynxn, xn) for some yn, xn, y, x such that yn → y ad xn → x.
By hypothesis, U(yn) − D(yn, xn) ≥ U(xn) − D(xn, xn) for all n. As D(xn, xn) = 0 for all n, the
inequality reduces to U(yn) − D(yn, xn) ≥ U(xn) for all n. Since U is continuous and −D is upper
semi-continuous, taking the limsup of both sides gives U(y) − D(y, x) ≥ U(x) which is equivalent to
U(y) − D(y, x) ≥ U(x) − D(x, x). This implies y ∈ c(yx, x) as desired. To verify Axiom UHC (ii), it
is enough to notice that U is continuous. Finally, to prove that Axiom UHC (iii) is also satisfied, assume
yn ∈ c(ynx, z) for some yn, y, x, z such that yn → y. This means U(yn)−D(yn, z) ≥ U(x)−D(x, z) for
all n. Taking limsup of both sides and the continuity of U together with the upper semi-continuity of −D
yields U(y)−D(y, z) ≥ U(x)−D(x, z). Thus, y ∈ c(yx, z). 2
(B) Proof of Section 3 Results
Lemma 3.0 In a Prisoner’s Dilemma D-game < Γx, F > with a population equilibrium ax, an agent
cooperates if and only if his status quo is Coop and (6− x) · px + 1 < Dθ(Defect, Coop).
Proof of Lemma 3.0
An agent with a status quo of Defect will necessarily defect as switching to Coop would lower his
utility and he would also incur a switching cost, two negative effects. On the other hand, if an agent has a
status quo of Coop, he will stick with Coop if and only if the following holds:
E [U1(Defect, a2)]−D1(Defect, Coop) < E [U1(Coop, a2)]
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7 · px + 2(1− px)−D1(Defect, Coop) < x · px + 1 · (1− px)
(7− x) · px + (1− px) < D1(Defect, Coop)
(6− x) · px + 1 < D1(Defect, Coop)
The agent will choose Coop if the above holds strictly, will choose Defect if the reverse holds strictly,
and will be indifferent between Coop and Defect if there is an equality. Tie-breaking can be done in any
fashion because the distribution is continuous, and so only for a measure 0 set of agents can the above hold
with equality.
2
Proof of Proposition 3.1
[Existence] The cooperation rate p is an equilibrium if p = 1 − F ((6 − x) · p + 1). Notice that when
p = 0, the LHS is strictly less than the RHS because of the full support condition. On the other hand, when
p = 1, the LHS is strictly higher than the RHS for the same reason. By continuity, there is some pˆ which
solves this condition.
[Uniqueness] Suppose not. Then, there are at least two different population equilibria with cooperation
rates p < q. By Lemma 3.0, an agent will cooperate if his status quo is Coop and his switching costs are
strictly above the cooperation threshold, and will defect if his switching cost is strictly below the cooperation
threshold. Therefore, in equilibrium, p = 1 − F ((6 − x) · p + 1) and q = 1 − F ((6 − x) · q + 1). So,
p < q implies F ((6− x) · p+ 1) > F ((6− x) · q + 1). Furthermore, F is strictly increasing because it is a
distribution function with full support, so it must be that (6− x) · p+ 1 > (6− x) · q+ 1⇒ p > q if x < 6.
If x = 6, then p = 1−F ((6− x) · p+ 1) = 1−F (1) = 1−F ((6− x) · q+ 1) = q. Either way, we arrive
at a contradiction, so there cannot be two distinct cooperation rates p, q. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.2
[Necessity] For the non-triviality condition, notice that in equilibrium px = 1−F ((6−x) · px + 1) and
since F has full support, it must be that 0 < px < 1.
For the monotonicity condition, take x < y ≤ 6. Due to non-triviality, it must be that 0 < px < 1 and
similarly 0 < py < 1. Now, suppose that px ≥ py. Then, (6− x) · px + 1 > (6− y) · py + 1 and because F
has full support, it is the case that px = 1− F ((6− x) · px + 1) < 1− F ((6− y) · py + 1) = py, which is
a contradiction.
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For the threshold condition, notice that we have px = F (θ : sθ = Coop, (6 − x) · px + 1 < Dθ) by
Lemma 3.0. By the monotonicity condition proved above, px−1 < px and so the threshold (6− x) · px + 1
has to be strictly decreasing in x. Rearranging yields the identity.
[Sufficiency] For any given px that satisfies the above two properties, we must construct a distribution
F with full support which generates cooperation rate px. For now, we momentarily assume that all agents
have a Coop status quo, so that F is simply a distribution over switching costs. Lemma 3.0 established
that a type θ cooperates in Γx if (6 − x)px + 1 < Dθ(Defect, Coop). As the distribution is continuous
with full support, switching cost threshold is dx = (6 − x)px + 1. The distribution F must then satisfy
that 1 − F (dx) = px, or F (dx) = 1 − px. That is, there are four given cooperation rates p3, p4, p5, p6 and
four induced switching cost thresholds d3, d4, d5, d6, and F is defined so that F (dx) = 1 − px for each
x. But, it needs to be verified that F is indeed a distribution, i.e. it is increasing, non-negative, and less
than 1. Condition 1 establishes that p3 < p4 < p5 < p6 and Condition 2 establishes that (6 − x)px <
(7 − x)px−1 ⇒ (6 − x)px + 1 < (6 − (x − 1))px−1 + 1 ⇒ dx < dx−1. Therefore, d3 > d4 > d5 > d6,
establishing that F is increasing. Because 0 < px < 1, so is 0 < 1 − px < 1 and therefore, 0 < F < 1
for the defined x-values. Now, we can take any F with full support over switching costs which satisfies
these point restrictions. Then, we can take a full support F so that a fraction of agents with switching costs
beneath the lowest threshold, d3, are reassigned to have Defect as a status quo. Those agents will always
defect, regardless of whether their status quo is Defect or Coop and so can be safely reassigned without
disturbing the cooperation rate so as to guarantee the full support of F . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.3
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma MT-Game< Γx, F >, given that other players are cooperating with probability
p, an agent with type λ chooses Coop if and only if
λ · x+ (1− λ) · (xp+ 1 · (1− p)) ≥ 2λ+ (1− λ) · (7p+ 2 · (1− p))⇔
λ · (x− 2) + (1− λ) · ((x− 7)p− (1− p)) ≥ 0
The second equation is a convex combination of the positive term x − 2 and the negative term ((x −
7)p− (1− p)) = (x− 6)p− 1. Therefore, for any given cooperation rate p, there will be a unique threshold
λˆ such that types with λ above this threshold will cooperate while types below this threshold will defect.
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This threshold can be calculated by solving:
λˆ · (x− 2) + (1− λˆ) · ((x− 6)p− 1) = 0 (*)
Also, as only agents above this threshold cooperate, the following must also hold:
p = 1− F (λˆ) (**)
Suppose x < 6. If we solve for p in (∗), we see that p is increasing in λˆ. If we solve for p in (∗∗), we
see that p is decreasing in λˆ. Since an increasing and decreasing function can intersect at most once, there
is at most a unique cooperation rate p and threshold λˆ which satisfies the equilibrium conditions. Moreover,
that there is an intersection can be gleaned from the following fact:
If p = 0 then
(∗)︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ = 1/(x− 1) <
(∗∗)︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ =∞, and if p = 1 then
(∗)︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ = (7− x)/5 >
(∗∗)︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ = 0.
Therefore, when x < 6, an MT-population equilibrium exists and is unique.
Finally, for the case that x = 6, conditon (*) is λˆ · 4 + (1 − λˆ) · (−1) = 0 which implies λˆ = 1/5 and
by (**), p is uniquely defined as p = 1 − F (1/5). Therefore, when x = 6, an MT-population equilibrium
exists and is unique. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.4
[Necessity]
1. Equation (*) above defines λˆ(x− 2) + (1− λˆ)((x− 6)px − 1) = 0 which can then be re-expressed
as λˆ =
(6− x)px + 1
(6− x)px + x− 1 = 1 −
x− 2
(6− x)px + x− 1 . Notice that if x strictly increases and px weakly
decreases, then λˆ strictly decreases. But, if the threshold λˆ strictly decreases, then the cooperation rate px
must strictly increase (because 1− F (λˆ) = px), which is a contradiction. Therefore, as x strictly increases,
it must be that px strictly increases.
2. For the cooperation rates to have the relationship px−1 < px it must be that the threshold λˆ
is strictly decreasing in x. That is, 1 − x− 3
(7− x)px−1 + x− 2 > 1 −
x− 2
(6− x)px + x− 1 . Therefore,
(x−3)((6−x)px+x−1) < (x−2)((7−x)px−1 +x−2)⇒ (x−3)(6−x)px < (x−2)(7−x)px−1 +1.
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Rearranging yields px <
(x− 2)(7− x)
(x− 3)(6− x)px−1 +
1
(x− 3)(6− x) . Notice, the only x for which px and px−1
can be related are x = 4, 5, 6, but the condition holds vacuously for x = 6. Therefore, we are left with the
condition for x = 4, 5.
3. An agent cooperates if and only if λ · (x− 2) + (1− λ) · ((x− 7)px − (1− px) ≥ 0. This condition
is a convex combination of two terms, one positive and one negative. Therefore, for any fixed x ≤ 6, it
always holds if λ is sufficiently close to 1 and never holds if λ is sufficiently close to 0. Therefore, given
full support, there will be a non-zero measure of cooperators and a non-zero measure of defectors.
[Sufficiency] For any given cooperation rate px that satisfies the properties above, we must construct a
distribution F with full support which generates cooperation rate px. From the previous analysis, we have
established that a type λ cooperates if and only if λ(x − 2) + (1 − λ)((x − 7)px − (1 − px)) ≥ 0. As the
distribution is continuous with full support, the threshold λx is defined as λx(x−2) + (1−λx)((x−7)px−
(1 − px)) = 0. That is, agents with magical thinking levels above λx cooperate and those with magical
thinking levels below defect. The distribution F must then satisfy 1−F (λx) = px or F (λx) = 1−px. That
is, there are four given cooperation rates p3, p4, p5, p6 and four induced thresholds λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6, and F is
defined so that F (λx) = 1− px for each x. But, it needs to be verified that F is indeed a distribution, i.e. it
is increasing, non-negative, and less than 1. Condition 1 establishes that p3 < p4 < p5 < p6 and Condition
2 establishes that λ5 < λ4 < λ3. To see that λ6 < λ5, notice that λ6 = 1/5 and that p4 > 0 ⇒ λ5 > 1/4.
This establishes that F is increasing. Since 0 < px < 1, so is 0 < 1− px < 1 and therefore, 0 < F < 1 for
the defined x-values. Now, we can take any F with full support over magical thinking levels which satisfies
these point restrictions.
(ii) From Proposition 3.2, the switching cost threshold condition is px <
(
7− x
6− x
)
·px−1. This upper bound
can be rewritten as
(x− 3)(7− x)
(x− 3)(6− x)px−1 <
(x− 2)(7− x)
(x− 3)(6− x)px−1 +
1
(x− 3)(6− x) . Therefore, Condition 2
of Proposition 3.2 is tighter than Condition 2 of Proposition 3.4. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.5
[Existence] Recall that
Vi = Ui − αi max
j
(Ui − Uj , 0)− βi max
j
(Uj − Ui, 0).
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Every agent defecting is always an equilibrium. To see that cooperating is non-beneficial, notice that it
results in lower utility U and inequity aversion −6β. Since both of these effects are negative, so is the total
effect.
[Non-Uniqueness] For simplicity, take x = 6. An agent cooperates if and only if
6p+ (1− p)− 6β(1− p) > 7p+ 2(1− p)− 6αp⇔
6αp− 6β(1− p) > 1
Given a cooperation rate p, as a best response, a fraction BR(p) of the population would wish to cooperate.
We seek a fixed point, that is BR(p) = p, which will define an equilibrium. First, notice that if p = 1/2,
the above equation becomes 3(α − β) > 1 which never holds because β > α, so BR(1/2) = 0. On the
other hand, if p = 5/6, then any agent who satisfies 5α − β > 1 will cooperate. So, take a distribution
F with full support over ΘIA such that Pr(5α − β > 1) = 0.99. Then, BR(5/6) = 0.99 > 5/6.
Because BR is continuous in p, there must exist some 1/2 < p′ < 5/6 such that BR(p′) = p′, a non-trivial
equilibrium. Recall that all agents defecting is also an equilibrium, so for such an F , the existence of at least
two equilibria is now established. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Given the inequity aversion utility function, an agent cooperates if and only if
xpx + (1− px)− 6β(1− px) > 7px + 2(1− px)− 6αpx
If px > 0, then it must be that some agent prefers Coop to Defect. The RHS of the above inequality is
decreasing in α and bounded above by β. So, the following is necessary:
xpx + (1− px)− 6β(1− px) > 7px + 2(1− px)− 6αpx > 7px + 2(1− px)− 6βpx
⇒ 6β(2px − 1) > px(6− x) + 1.
The RHS of the last inequality above is positive, so cooperation can only be sustained if the LHS is also
positive, that is px > 1/2. Therefore, any cooperation rate px where 1/2 > px > 0 cannot be sustained by
this model. Now, restricting attention to cooperation rates px ≥ 1/2, we derive a tighter necessary condition.
As the LHS is increasing in β and β < 1, it is necessary that
6(2px − 1) > 6β(2px − 1) > px(6− x) + 1
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⇒ px > 7
6 + x
The argument is completed. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.7
[Existence] Every player defecting is an equilibrium. This is because, for any player, switching to Coop
is harmful for both their material incentive U and the kindness payoff λK.
[Non-Uniqueness] We now provide an example for which there are infinitely many cooperative equi-
libria. Take the payoffs of Charness et al. (2016) with x = 6. Thus,
V1(C,C) = 6 + α · 3
4
V1(C,D) = 1 + α · −1
4
V1(D,C) = 7 + α · −1
4
V1(D,D) = 2 + α · 3
4
Therefore, if a p fraction of the population cooperates, a player’s expected payoffs are:
E [V1(C, a2)|p] = 6p+ 1 · (1− p) + α ·
(
p− 1
4
)
E [V1(D, a2)|p] = 7p+ 2 · (1− p) + α ·
(
3
4
− p
)
Thus, an agent cooperates if and only if −1 +α(2p− 1) ≥ 0. This implies that the cooperation rate p is
sustainable in equilibrium if there is a αˆ such that αˆ(2p− 1) = 1 and 1−F (αˆ) = p. Substituting in, it must
be that αˆ(2(1 − F (αˆ)) − 1) = 1. Hence, F (αˆ) = αˆ− 1
2αˆ
. Now define F as such for αˆ ∈ [1, 2] and freely
elsewhere. Then, every αˆ ∈ [1, 2] corresponds to an equilibrium with p = 1−F (αˆ) = 1− αˆ− 1
2α
=
αˆ+ 1
2αˆ
.
That is, every cooperation rate from 75% (when αˆ = 2) to 100% (when αˆ = 1) is an equilibrium with such
an F . So we obtain a continuum of equilibria. As F was assigned freely outside of the range [1, 2], there
could be other equilibria as well. Moreover, F could have been similarly assigned on a larger range so as to
generate an even larger set of equilibrium. 2
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Proof of Proposition 3.8
Suppose that 1/2 ≥ px > 0. Then, it is the case that
pxU1(Defect, Coop) + (1− px)U1(Defect,Defect) >
pxU1(Coop,Coop) + (1− px)U1(Coop,Defect)
and
λpxK(Defect, Coop) + λ(1− px)K(Defect,Defect) ≥
λpxK(Coop,Coop) + λ(1− px)K(Coop,Defect)
Notice that plugging in the values of utility and K functions, and with terms matched up as shown, both
these inequalities hold. Therefore, it is the case that:
pxV1(Defect, Coop) + (1− px) V1(Defect,Defect) >
pxV1(Coop,Coop) + (1− px) V1 (Coop,Defect)
So, every agent who chooses Coop can profitably deviate to Defect, which is a contradiction to px > 0. 2
Appendix II
Additional Analysis of Masatlioglu and Uler’s (2013) Data
We focus on Masatlioglu and Uler’s (2013) experimental design to the extent that is relevant for our
study. We consider two types of questions. The first type is status quo-free choice problems where each
subject is asked to make a choice between two alternatives, say x and y, i.e. c(xy, ) is observed for each
subject. In the second type of questions, each subject is asked to imagine that he is given a status quo z that
is dominated by both x and y; and he is asked to decide whether he wants to keep his status quo or change it
for one of the other options x and y, i.e. c(xyz, z) is observed for each subject (Figure 1). Each alternative
is a bundle that is composed of some number of Guylian chocolate boxes and some amount of cash. At the
end of the experiment, a question is randomly drawn for each subject and he receives the bundle that he has
selected there.
We test the following property which is a modified version of the Status Quo Irrelevance axiom discussed
in Section 2.
If c(xz, z) = x and c(yz, z) = y, then c(xy, ) = c(xyz, z)
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Figure 1: Bundles
According to the above property, z has no impact on the agent’s choice between x and y when it is added
into his choice set also with the feature that it is the status quo, because the agent is willing to leave z for
both x and y. While this property must be satisfied by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014), it need not be the
case in the switching cost model.
Since z is dominated by both x and y, a basic expectation is that z will not be chosen from choice
problems (xz, z) and (yz, z). Thus, the if condition of the above property is expected to be naturally
satisfied. Based on this expectation, Masatlioglu and Uler (2013) do not include questions of this type in
their design and therefore the if condition cannot be directly verified in their data. However, they include
questions of the type (xyz, z) and no subject chooses z there.
We test whether c(xy, ) = c(xyz, z) holds. When c(xy, ) is different from c(xyz, z), we say that
a choice reversal occurs at the status quo z. Otherwise, no reversal occurs at the status quo z. For each
subject, there are three possible instances where a reversal may occur. We define a variable called REV to
summarize the percentage of reversals each subject exhibits. The mean of REV is 31.66%. That is, 31.66%
of the time, agents switch their choice from x to y or y to x upon the addition of a dominated status quo z
into their choice problem. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that this percentage is significantly different
from zero (p=0.005). Therefore, the above property is violated significantly.22
22If these choice reversals are driven by a preference for randomness or are simply mistakes, then the frequency of reversals
should be independent of the dominated status quo’s location. Using McNemar test, we reject the hypothesis that reversals at two
different status quos occur at the same rate (p = 0.0082).
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